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Book Review
Jensen and the Science of Psychometrics: A Legal
Perspective
BIAs IN MENTAL TESTING. By Arthur R. Jensen. New York: The

Free Press, 1980. Pp. xiii, 786. $29.95.
BRYANT GARTH*

An effort to confront the science of psychometrics from a legal
point of view must begin with the recognition that lawyers and
courts have had considerable difficulty with social science data.
The general problem has stimulated a growing body of commentary, particularly in the field of law and education.' The marriage
of law and social science envisioned by Brown v. Board of Education2 has not been a happy one.3 A number of commentators, for
example, have suggested that the courts have erred because they
* B.A. 1972, Yale University, J.D. 1975, Stanford University; Ph.D. 1979, European University Institute (Florence). Assistant Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law
(Bloomington). The author would like to thank Professor Hendrik Hartog and Dr. Susan
Stager for their helpful criticisms of an earlier draft of this review.
I For detailed discussion of the issues from several points of view, see THE CouRTs, SoCIAL SCIENCE, AND SCHOOL DESEGREGATION (B. Levin & W. Hawley eds. 1977); EDUCATION,
SOCIAL SCIENCE, AND TH JUrCIL PRocEss (R.Rist & R.Anson eds. 1977); Symposium,
School Desegregation:Lessons of the First Twenty-Five Years, LAw & CoNTmw. PROB.,
Summer & Autumn, 1978.
2 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
' Kenneth B. Clark, whose work was cited in the famous footnote 11 in Brown, id. at 484
n.11, stated:
In the optimism of the early 1950's-an optimism I not only shared but participated in with enthusiasm-social scientists, with a few exceptions, tended
to accept uncritically the belief that they not only had a role but the obligation
to organize, interpret, and make available to policy-makers ... social science
data that bore directly or indirectly on social issues.
Clark, Social Science, ConstitutionalRights, and the Courts, in EDUCATION, SOCIAL SCIENCE, AND THE JUDICIAL PRoCEss, supra note 1, at 1, 5. Clark now sees the situation as
drastically changed. In the words of Mark Yudof: "A profound skepticism has crept into the
relationship between law and the social sciences." Yudof, School Desegregation:Legal Realism, Reasoned Elaboration,and Social Science, LAw & CoNTmiP. PROB., Autumn, 1978, 57,
71.
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have not been well-apprised of social science learning. 4 Others have
contended that judicial failures have reflected instead the inadequacy of the social science data itself.' Still another group of commentators has argued that issues involving complex social science
(or natural science) questions are just too difficult for regular
courts ever to handle properly.6 The problem is a serious one, and
the boom in law-related empirical research and new types of legal
activism suggests that it will become even more important in future years.
The problem of reconciling law and social science is highlighted
in the field of mental testing. Not only is such testing tied up with
complicated issues of educational policy, but also the science of
mental "measurement"-psychometrics-is an extremely technical
one. Nevertheless, the law is becoming increasingly concerned with
these issues. 7 Federal legislation providing opportunities for the

handicapped implicates testing issues,8 civil rights legislation inevitably raises the problem of testing that has an adverse impact on
protected minorities,9 and the momentum of court-ordered desegregation has led to inquiries into school admissions10 and classifica-

4 See, e.g., Miller & Barron, The Supreme Court, the Adversary System, and the Flow of
Information to the Justices: A PreliminaryInquiry, 61 VA. L. Rlv. 1187 (1975).
E.g., Levin & Hawley, Foreword to Symposium, supra note 1, at 3:
Almost all of the social scientists writing for this symposium, in reviewing
the existing research-published and unpublished-in their respective fields
note how little competent research has actually been done to date.
Accord, Yudof, supra note 3, at 108-10.
' Betsy Levin, for example, emphasizes that "the adversary system process is not always
the most effective way of presenting an issue." Levin, School DesegregationRemedies and
the Role of Social Science Research, LAw & CONTEMP. PROS., Autumn, 1978, 1, 35.
For an argument that these kinds of issues should be resolved by an institution other than
a regular court, see Thibaut & Walker, A Theory of Procedure, 66 CALIF. L. Rav. 541 (1978).
See generally Bersoff, Regarding Psychologists Testily: Legal Regulation of Psychological Assessment in the Public Schools, 39 MD. L. Rav. 27 (1979).
' The regulations promulgated under the Education of the Handicapped Act of 1975, §
5(a), 20 U.S.C. § 1417(b) (1976), require, for example, that "[t]ests and other evaluation
materials... [h]ave been validated for the specific purpose for which they are used." 45
C.F.R. § 121a 532(a) (1979). A similar regulation in the rehabilitation area is found at 45
C.F.R. § 84.35(b)(1) (1978).
1 In particular, testing issues frequently come up in litigation under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1976) as amended by Pub. L. No. 95-555, § 1, Oct. 31,
1978, 92 Stat. 2076; Pub. L. No. 95-598, tit. II, § 330, 92 Stat. 2679 (codified at 49 U.S.C. §
2000e (Supp. MI1978)), as interpreted most notably in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S.
424 (1971). See B. ScHLm & P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DIsCRIMINATION LAw 65-131 (1976).
10 The role of standardized testing in admissions to higher education has been raised by
cases such as Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978), and DeFunis v.
Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 337-41 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting). In Bakke, Justice Powell's

opinion for the Court stated:
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tions and assignments of minorities within schools.11 The recent
Nader Report 2 and the Nader-inspired "truth-in-testing" movement have put psychometrics further on the legal defensive.13 It is
particularly appropriate, therefore, for legal analysts to examine
the social science of psychometrics. Such an examination will be
my basic purpose in this review.
Arthur Jensen's recent book, Bias in Mental Testing,1' can be
seen as the psychometric response to legal and other policy-oriented attacks on standardized testing. It criticizes in detail particular legal decisions, the assumptions of testing critics and the details of the arguments against testing. As Jensen claims at the
outset, those who attack the tests as biased "will henceforth have
this book to contend with"; it is an "exhaustive review of the empirical research bearing on this issue. 1

5

The book is meant not

just for technical specialists, but also, as emphasized on its jacket,
for lawyers, educators, parents and others interested in the role of
Nothing in this record-asopposed to some of the general literature cited by
MR. JUSTICE BarENNAN, MR. JUSTICE WHITE, MR.JUSTICE MARSHALL, and MR.
JUSTICE BLACKAuN--even remotely suggests that the disparate impact of the
general admissions program at Davis Medical School, resulting primarily from
the sort of disparate test scores and grades set forth in n.7, supra, is without
educational justification.
438 U.S. at 308 n.44.
A number of commentators have suggested that the case for special admissions programs
should be based on a specific attack on the standardized tests used for admission. See, e.g.,
Bell, Introduction: Awakening After Bakke, 14 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rnv. 1, 3-4 (1979);
White, CulturallyBiased Testing and Predictive Validity: Putting Them on the Record, 14
HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 89 (1979). See generally A. SINDLER, BAKKE, DEFUNIS, AND MINORTry ADMISSIONS (1978).
" The Supreme Court, in addition, has indicated that remedies for school segregation
may include provisions concerning testing and pupil assignment within schools. Milliken v.
Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 287-88 (1977). Leading cases directly concerned with testing and
tracking include Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401 (D.D.C. 1967), aff'd sub. nom. Smuck
v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (enjoining the Washington, D.C. tracking system
on equal protection grounds); Lora v. Board of Educ., 456 F. Supp. 1211 (E.D.N.Y. 1978)
(declaring invalid on constitutional and statutory grounds the method of assigning students
to special public schools for the emotionally handicapped in New York City); Larry P. v.
Riles, No. C-71-2270 R.F.P. (N.D. Cal. Oct. 16, 1979), appeal docketed, No. 80-4029 (9th
Cir. Jan. 17, 1980) (enjoining on federal and state grounds the use of "intelligence tests" to
place black students in classes for the "educable mentally retarded"). But see Parents in
Action on Special Educ. v. Hannon, No. 74-C-3586 (N.D. Ill. July 7, 1980) (rejecting a challenge to IQ tests by black educable mentally handicapped students in Chicago). See note 81
infra.
11 A. NAIRN, THE REIGN OF ETS (1980).
Is See, e.g., Robertson, Examining the Examiners: The Trend Toward Truth in Testing,
9 J.L. & EDuc. 167 (1980) (using cost-benefit analysis to justify the truth-in-testing laws).
1,A. JENSEN, Bus IN MENAL TESTING (1980).
13 Id. at ix.
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standardized testing in our society.
Jensen amasses a tremendous amount of technical data as part
of his counterattack on critics such as those who have sought to
put tests on trial in the courts. It is tempting for the uninitiated
lawyer to despair when confronted with all this technical data. A
careful examination of Jensen's scientific argument from a legal
policy-oriented point of view, however, provides surprising results;
it vindicates much of the recent legal involvement in testing issues.
Without challenging Jensen's technical analysis, I think it can be
shown that, while his defense of testing may be successful on one
level, it fails to be persuasive on the major questions of interest to
the law. The tests themselves may not be biased in a psychometric
sense against minorities, but many normal uses of the tests lead to
unjustifiably "biased" results in the sense of "unfair" denials of
opportunity to members of certain minority groups. When Jensen's
assumptions are distinguished from his science, and when elementary legal assumptions are factored into the analysis, his "defense"
of testing turns into a fairly straightforward, limited argument implying that standardized testing should be the basis for classification and placement in a relatively small number of settings.
THE STARTING POINT: EQUALITY OF POTENTIAL

The starting point for a modern legal analysis must be the assumption of equality of intellectual potential among particular racial groups and social classes.1" Consistent with our constitutional
18I recognize that an argument can be made for legal adoption of Jensen's "agnosticism,"
at least in some cases. The assumption of equality of potential may, for example, appear to
provide little guidance in cases where intentional discrimination must be shown. The key
issues involved with testing, admissions, and placements, however, tend to force a choice
between the assumptions of inequality and equality of potential. See notes 22-26 & accompanying text infra. In addition, the assumption of equality is implicit in the law in several
areas, including the testing cases discussed in the text, school desegregation, and employment discrimination. The recent Supreme Court decision in Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S.
267 (1977), for example, held that remedial instruction and other compensatory education
programs could be ordered as part of a desegregation remedy on the theory that it was
necessary to restore victims of discrimination to the position they would have occupied in
the absence of discrimination. Id. at 281-88. The implicit assumption is that the compensatory programs are necessary to raise the performance of the victims of discrimination to the
level of the white majority, which is what would presumably have been the case in the absence of discrimination. Some commentators have urged that the courts infer discrimination
against minorities in a racially imbalanced school from, inter alia, "scores on standardized
tests," again assuming performance of groups would have been the same absent discrimination in education. See, e.g., Fiss, Racial Imbalance in the Public Schools: The Constitutional Concepts, 78 HARv. L. Rav. 564, 604 (1965). For a critical discussion of how courts
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interpretation of equal protection, it would be impermissible to
limit individual opportunities for minorities on the assumption
that members of the group are, on the average, intellectually less
capable than members of the white majority. The assumption must
be the opposite one, and a heavy burden should be imposed on one
who seeks to challenge that assumption.
Jensen is ambivalent about the assumption of equality. On the
one hand, he signals a retreat from his statement in 1969 that
"[c]ompensatory education has been tried and it apparently has
failed," primarily because of "genetic factors. ' 17 Jensen now states:
We no longer speak of any kind of test score as a measure of
a person's capacity or potential .... The notions of capacity
and potential suggest some clear-cut and inexorable upper
limit of development. But this is a metaphysical rather than a
strictly scientific notion. 18
Moreover,
The nearest we can come to giving any scientific meaning to
the disfavored notions of "capacity" and "potential" is the concept of genotypic value. But ... this concept has quite different meanings and implications than "capacity" and "potential," and, furthermore, it can only be estimated from test
scores probabilistically, with a rather wide margin of error for
any individual.19
Psychometrics will not tell us about a person's capacity or potential. We cannot, therefore, use tests to characterize the potential or
capacity of a race or social group.
On the other hand, Jensen emphasizes with similar force that:
and commentators have in the 1960's and early 1970's tended to turn an assumption of
equality of potential into an assumption that nondiscriminatory schooling would lead to
equality of result, see Yudof, Equal Educational Opportunity and the Courts, 51 T x. L.
REv. 411 (1973). After the focus shifted to the issue of proving intentional discrimination,
the assumption of equality of potential may also be relevant to a finding on intent. In Larry
P. v. Riles, No. C-71-2270 R.F.P., slip op. at 86-88 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 16, 1979), appeal docketed, No. 80-4029 (9th Cir. Jan. 17, 1980), for example, the district court's finding on intent
was built in part on the state's evident failure to make any effort to investigate a situation
inconsistent with the equality assumption. See also Bersoff, supra note 7, at 93-94.
In emplojment discrimination litigation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
the Griggs formula for imposing a duty to validate assumes that minority individuals with
qualifications similar to majority individuals hired for certain positions are generally capable
of doing the same work, even if they score lower, on the average, on intelligence tests. See
generally B. ScHLi & P. GRossMAN, supra note 9, at 65-131; 29 C.F.R. § 1607 (1979).
17Jensen, How Much Can We Boost IQ and Scholastic Achievement?, 39 HARv. Emuc.
Rav. 1, 2 (1969).
IsA. JENSEN, supra note 14, at 242.
1I Id. at 245.
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"The assumption of equal or equivalent intelligence across all
human populations ... whatever its ideological basis, is scientifi-

cally unwarranted. 2 0 He evidently supports some sort of agnostic
position, which he uses to mount his critique of "tests on trial." He
challenges in some detail the judicial acquiescence in that "unwarranted" assumption.2 1 What he misses, however, is that in these
cases courts must have a working assumption, a starting point
from which to consider the evidence, and courts necessarily will
place a heavy burden on anyone who attempts to disprove the assumption of equality of potential.
A brief review of Jensen's analyses of a couple of court cases
helps to reveal the significance of the assumption of equality and
the problems with Jensen's call for agnosticism. Judge Wright in
his famous Hobson v. Hansen decision refused among other things
to allow the Washington, D.C. "tracking" system to continue.22
Children were assigned to the various curricular programs, or
tracks, largely on the basis of standardized group intelligence tests
used to evaluate the potential of each student for educational success. Black children, on the average, scored lower than did white
children. The tracking system accordingly kept a disproportionate
number of black children in lower tracks characterized by very limited instruction, thus guaranteeing their educational failure. Jensen of course defends the tests used to assign to the various tracks,
and he argues that it does not matter if tests measure innate ability or potential. But obviously it does matter what the tests do
show. The issue before the court was simple: either relatively more
black children have that limited potential, or they do not. If they
do not, some black individuals are being caused irreparable harm
from misclassification. Tests cannot be utilized validly for these assignments unless, in Judge Wright's analysis, they measure potential or unless that potential is in fact distributed differently in different races. Given the grave consequences of misclassification and
the invidious nature of any assumption of inequality, the burden
had to be on defendants, and they could not prove either of these
facts. Jensen's defense of the tests simply fails to address the central issue of the case.
Jensen also discusses in some detail the California cases of Di20
11

Id. at 370.
Id. at 27-40 (a critical discussion of leading judicial opinions implicating testing issues).
Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401 (D.D.C. 1967). See generally A. JENSEN, supra

note 14, at 27-30.
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ana v. Board of Education and Larry P. v.Riles,24 which success-

fully challenged the use of IQ testing to place Hispanic and black
children, respectively, in "deadend" classes for the "educable mentally retarded." Here Jensen emphasizes in particular the judicial
reliance on "the assumption that scholastic aptitude is equally distributed in all races, an assumption that went unchallenged."2 5 Indeed, it is instructive that defense lawyers in Larry P. met twice
with Jensen but still neglected to contest in court the assumption
of equality. 26 The assumption again had to be that educable
mental retardation-which permits roughly about a fourth grade
education-was evenly distributed among different racial groups.
IQ test scores could not disprove that assumption, and in the absence of other persuasive evidence, the court had to invalidate testing used to perpetuate a grossly unequal education for many minority individuals.
Jensen's personal assumptions about race and intelligence may
point one way, but the law must assume otherwise. As a scientist,
in fact, Jensen recognizes that the data supporting his assumption
are insufficient to persuade those who begin with a different assumption. That is part of what makes his new book interesting. As
will be seen, most of -the serious policy arguments in the book are
built on what Jensen evidently feels is the strongest scientific defense of psychometrics, the predictive validity of standardized test
scores.
THE "SCmNTIFC" RATHER THAN GENETIC DEFENSE OF
MENTAL TESTING

Jensen's "scientific" argument in this book generally stays
within the framework of the prevailing, legally-dictated assumption of equality. Notions of capacity or potential are disclaimed at
2 No. C-70-37 R.F.P. (N.D. Cal., stipulated settlement filed June 18, 1973); A. JENSEN,
supra note 14, at 30-31.
No. C-71-2270 R.F.P. (N.D. Cal. Oct. 16, 1979), appeal docketed, No. 80-4029 (9th Cir.
Jan. 17, 1980); A. JENSEN, supra note 14, at 32-34.
" A. JENSEN, supra note 14, at 33; see id. at 31.
26 There was evidently some disagreement between the State Superintendent of Public
Instruction, Wilson Riles, who emphatically rejected any genetic hypothesis, and defense
counsel. In any event, the defense in Larry P. argued primarily that racial imbalance in the
classes related to nutritional deficiencies among black children, which led to an increased
incidence of mild mental retardation. Noting inter alia that the incidence of severe mental
retardation was not different between the black and white populations, the court rejected
that contention. See Larry P. v. Riles, No. C-71-2270 R.F.P., slip op. at 43-45 (N.D. Cal.
Oct. 16, 1979), appeal docketed, No. 80-4029 (9th Cir. Jan. 17, 1980).
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the outset, as noted before, and they are also separated carefully
from questions of testing validity:
Scientifically, all we can do in any test situation is measure
an individual's performance then and there on the particular
test at that particular time with that particular examiner....
From this performance measure-the test score-we can make
conditionalprobability
statements based on research with the
27
particular test.

Furthermore: "Conditional probability statements based on empirical research simply
do not include or require the notions of capac' 28
potential.
or
ity
The relatively narrow implications of this scientific defense of
testing can be flushed out by examining briefly, with Jensen's guidance, methods based on conditional probabilities used to establish the "validity" of standardized tests. Jensen refers to the four
types of validity as "the four c's"-content, construct, concurrent
and criterion validity. "Concurrent validity," as Jensen defines it,
merits little attention here. It refers mainly to the comparison of
one test with another taken at the same time, and Jensen freely
'2
admits that "[tlhere are dangers in this type of validation.
"Content validity" findings also are outside our major concerns.
That validity refers simply to the extent that test items fairly sample the appropriate universe of knowledge and "is most relevant to
achievement tests, job-knowledge tests, and work sample tests."80
"Construct validity" raises more serious issues for legal policy.
This is the "attempt scientifically to understand, in psychological
terms, what the test measures." 1 A careful examination of this attempt is needed, because a complete acceptance of construct validity may constitute an admission that "intelligence tests" really do
measure "intelligence," or at least give a good prediction of how
"intelligent" a person is. The validation of test results in that sense
could cut against our legal assumption of equal potential. Jensen,
however, admits to serious limitations on construct validity and,
more importantly, makes few considered pronouncements claiming
that intelligence tests can effectively measure or predict any fixed
status, as opposed to providing a prediction of a future
performance.
A. JENsaN, supra note 14, at 242.
'

Id. at 243.

29 Id. at 302.
1*Id. at 297; see id. at 741.
31Id. at 303.
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Jensen notes that construct validity "is a complex, open-ended
affair, "32 and that the "task of construct validation is never really
completed." ' It depends on the plausibility of the theoretical work
being done by psychologists. That work at best provides little support for an effort to use tests to ascertain "intelligence" as a fixed
and objective quality. Jensen quotes with approval, for example,
the definition of intelligence provided by Lloyd G. Humphreys, another staunch defender of testing.3 4 According to Humphreys, intelligence is "the entire repertoire of acquired skills, knowledge,
learning sets, and generalization tendencies considered intellectual
in nature that are available at any period of time," with the skills
that are "intellectual in nature" taken from a "consensus among
psychologists at any given time." 35 Even if we accept the argument
that intelligence tests accurately tap this "repertoire of acquired
skills," that does not solve the problem of what low "intelligence"
means in terms of the ultimate potential of a person to achieve.3 6
It can only give rise to predictions of future performance, which
are discussed below. Jensen therefore does not argue that construct
validity justifies firm conclusions based upon the results of intelligence tests.
In one instance, however, Jensen appears to claim that intelligence tests can measure capacity to learn. Early in the book he
defines "mental retardation" parenthetically as IQ's below 70.3
Subsequently he argues that a low IQ "is disabling in mathematics
. *. and in English composition and reading comprehension"3 8 and

claims that a child with an IQ of about 75 or below "cannot master
the traditional subject matter of elementary school." 39 If this assertion were accepted, it would appear to justify the treatment of
children with low IQ's as lacking the potential to master certain
skills. It appears, however, that Jensen is merely reiterating a conn Id. at 420.
3

Id. at 304.

3 Id. at 170 (quoting Humphreys, Theory of Intelligence, in INTELLIGENCE 31, 31-32 (R.
Cancro ed. 1971)).

SId.
Jensen's long explication of the hypothetical construct termed g represents an effort to
equate intelligence with what the tests measure. See A. JENSEN, supra note 14, at 169-258.
But even if g exists as postulated by Jensen, it does not necessarily require one to accept the
notion of innateness or limited potential. At best, it represents a current ability to perform
on a number of tests.
37 Id. at 84.

Id. at 107.

" Id.at 114.
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venient, overly simplified, psychological definition.4 0 Significantly,
Jensen rather uncharacteristically cites no studies to support the
permanently "disabling" nature of a low IQ, and also uncharacteristically provides no comparative racial and ethnic group data. It is
perfectly possible, for example, that IQ scores could predict future
performance accurately for black and white children, but that
black children with the same scores as middle class whites might
achieve better if given a quality education or a home environment
more conducive to normal school learning. Jensen's asides about
the meaning of low IQ's must be seen as outside his central argument in this book.
The key to Jensen's scientific defense of testing is the ability of
tests to predict future performances-"criterion" or "predictive"
validity. As he defines it, "[t]his is the ability of test scores to predict performance in some endeavor that is external to the test itself, called the criterion."'1 Its central importance, and the reason
it cannot be neglected, is that it "depends entirely on empirical
demonstration."' 2 It "is probably the most important, defensible,
and convincing type of validation in the practical use of psychological tests.'4 3 Predictive validity, as will be seen, is not inconsistent
with the assumption of equal potential.
The discussion of predictive validity in the book may be subject
to some methodological challenge, especially as it relates to minority groups. Jensen admits, for example, that for elementary school
"the published evidence . . . is surprisingly meager," 44 and, for
45
secondary school, "[h]ere, too, the evidence is surprisingly scant."'
But Jensen does produce a substantial body of evidence for his position that "differential validity for the two racial groups [black
and white] is a virtually nonexistent phenomenon.' 4 We must
consider the implications of the not surprising finding that the
tests do have essentially the same predictive validity regardless of
40 The relatively arbitrary nature of this definition is also evidenced by the history of the

American Association on Mental Deficiency's definition of mental retardation. The Association had previously considered children who scored one standard deviation below the mean
on intelligence tests as mentally retarded. However, in 1973 the Association revised its definition to include only those who scored two or more standard deviations below the mean.
AMERacAN AssOcIATIoN ON MENTAL DEFICIENCY, MANUAL
TION IN MENTAL RETARDATION 4, 11 (1973 rev.).
41 A. JENSEN, supra note 14, at 298.
42 Id.
43 Id.
" Id. at 472.
45 Id. at 474.
46 Id. at 515.

ON TERMINOLOGY AND CLASSIFICA-
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race or class.

7

Moreover, it is notable that recent criticisms of test-

ing, such as the Nader Report on the Educational Testing Service,
do not focus on any differences in predictive validity between different races or ethnic groups. 8 Jensen is correct in his argument
that predictive validity is the most convincing standard by which
to defend the tests, and we must consider the implications of that
type of validity.
IMPLICATIONS OF "PREDICTIVE VALMITY"

Predictive validity of intelligence tests is the central claim of the
psychometricians. As Jensen describes it, the validity varies somewhat among various standardized intelligence tests. Tests designed
specifically to measure intelligence, such as the Wechsler battery of
tests and the Stanford-Binet, tend to correlate with achievement
by .60-.70 in elementary school, .50-.60 in high school, .40-.50 in
college, and .30-.40 in graduate school.' 9 As the declining correlations indicate, other standardized tests tend to have a greater validity as individuals get older. Such tests can measure. specific
learning-achievement-which "involves more different identifiable causal factors and correlates than IQ, which is simply the single most important factor. '

50

Achievement relates to other person-

ality traits, such as motivation, emotional stability, persistence and
work habits.
Tests such as the Scholastic Aptitude Tests, which combine
achievement and ability, predict grades in college by some .30-.70,
with a mean of .50.51 A test such as the Law School Admission
Test-"essentially a high-level verbal intelligence test"-correlates
about .30 with first year law school grades.5 2 The aptitude and intelligence distinction, however, is not a very clear one. Jensen
quotes with approval a statement that "the quality of students admitted to a graduate program would be about the same if the test
used for selecting them were the GRE, the Miller Analogies Test,
47 As one reviewer of Jensen has noted, "It would be a poor reflection indeed on the
technical competence of psychometrics if, after nearly a century of effort, they had found no
way to eliminate such an elementary and undesirable effect as differential predictive validity." Gould, Jensen's Last Stand, N.Y. RsvPmw BooKs, May 1, 1980, at 38, 39.
48 See A. NAMN, supra note 12; see, e.g., Slack & Porter, The ScholasticAptitude Test: A
CriticalAppraisal, 50 HAv. EDuc. Rav. 154 (1980).
4"A. JENSEN, supra note 14, at 319.
Id. at 317.

51 Id. at 329.
"

Id. at 332-33.
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the CEEB-SAT, the ACT, the Law School Admission Test, the
Medical College Admission Test, or some other admission
test ....

Scores from each of these tests correlate very highly

[perhaps .80] with scores from the others. 5' All these tests are
measuring precisely the same skill, however acquired. According to
Jensen, that skill helps predict future educational performances
among all strata of American society.
But that evidence obviously does not take us very far. As Jensen
admits, the correlations with future performance are not particularly high. At one point, for example, he states that, in order to
predict 50 percent better than chance, it would take a correlation
of .866." Another way to see the same problem is by calculating
"variances" accounted for by test scores. Variance, meaning here
the proportion of the total variation in one variable (e.g., academic
performance) that is predictable from another variable, is obtained
by squaring the correlation coefficient. 5 In other words, to account
for the percentage of future academic performance by an individual predictable from the SAT alone, we can square .50, obtaining
.25. That means roughly that we can predict an individual's performance with a margin of error that is only 25 percent smaller
than it would be if we were to guess.
Furthermore, the predictive validity of intelligence and aptitude
tests for older students, as noted before, tends to lag behind the
simple indicator of past academic performance. While the "subjectivity" of grades is emphasized by Jensen, he admits that grades
do have predictive validity among older students that is as good or
better than that provided by the tests. For example, "[h]igh school
grades or the student's rank in his or her graduating class generally
predict college GPA at least as well as scores on college aptitude
tests."5 16
The phenomenon of the decreasing educational predictive validity of general aptitude or ability testing of older individuals is duplicated in the employment area. Jensen thinks there is a threshold IQ for certain occupations, 57 but it is of course difficult or
impossible to determine that threshold. In general, however, "[tihe
IQ and other ability test scores are considerably better at predicting persons' occupational statuses than at predicting how well they
83
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will perform in the particular occupational niche they enter."' , Experience, dedication, reliability, diligence, ability to get along and
other personal factors again become more important than IQ in
ultimate occupational success.
Serious limitations on standardized testing as described by Jensen therefore include a relatively low predictive validity for future
educational or occupational performance, and the fact that other
indicia, above all past performance, tend to have better correlations with future success. To these limitations must be added a
more fundamental one that is implicit in any reliance on predictive
validity. Predictive validity tells you that, with no change or intervention, it is more or less likely that the existence of one factor will
accurately predict the existence of another. To base individual decisions on predictive validity, however, is to assume that changes
cannot, or at least will not, be made to increase the likelihood of a
desired result. More concretely, remedial education, individualized
tutoring, on-the-job training, and other programs may make the
test score's prediction fail. To the extent that such programs exist
and can succeed, and Jensen here expresses no final opinion on
that point, obviously we should rely less on test scores. To the extent special programs do not exist and have not been tried, we can
question whether permitting reliance on test scores is simply an
impermissible excuse to perpetuate and legitimate inequality. A
further problem, however, is that in many instances the costs of
closing an educational or training gap may be deemed prohibitive.
Even if it is possible to take an illiterate forty-year-old and make
him a competent lawyer, we probably would be hesitant to expend
the resources required to do the job, whereas remedial reading for
eight-year-olds may be relatively easy to justify.
Jensen recognizes a number of the problems raised by reliance
on predictive validity. To his credit he examines some of the policy
implications which seem naturally to follow from a more qualified
acceptance of predictive validity, even though their implementation would result in a cutback in mental testing. For children in
primary schools, for example, Jensen argues against the administration of intelligence tests despite the fact that these tests predict
educational performance best among young children. He rejects
testing at young ages because the likely use of such tests is to limit
irrevocably the opportunities available to those with low scores
(who will often be poor or from minority groups). Intelligence
8

Id. at 347.
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tests, as the court cases discussed earlier showed, have been given
traditionally for the purpose of "ability grouping," typically including a "track" analogous to that sometimes called "educable
mentally retarded.

'59

Children in such tracks are generally deemed

(consistent with Jensen's assertion quoted earlier) to be incapable
of mastering a normal grade school curriculum. If "errors" are
made in assignment to this group, those who are misassigned are
subjected to a grossly inferior, permanently limiting education. If
we start with the assumption of equality and recognize the margin
of error in intelligence tests at their best, we should be reluctant to
tolerate discriminatory impacts here. Indeed, on the basis of the
margin of error alone Jensen reaches the same conclusion through
a kind of "burden of proof" analysis:
There is no compelling evidence that would justify ability
grouping in the elementary grades.... Grouping into separate

classes on the basis of either IQ or achievement test scores not
only stigmatizes the pupils in some classes as slow learners, but
limits the educational aspirations and opportunities of those
children placed in the slow groups, making it still more difficult
to catch up or keep up with their agemates if they are capable
of doing so.60
Jensen's scientific argument thus propels him to a conclusion consistent with Hobson v. Hansen and Larry P. By eliminating his
assumption of inequality, he has moved to a position consistent
with the assumption of equality.
For older children Jensen's awareness of the limits of his science
again causes him to be reluctant to limit opportunity on the basis
of test scores. For children seeking admission to "advanced" classes, he counsels:
[w]here there is any doubt about the pupil's prerequisite ability and the probability of his or her success in an elected
course, I believe the best "test" is the student's performance in
the course itself. The margin of error based on predictions of
future performance from test scores of any kind are [sic] large
enough that, when at all feasible, I would let the motivated
student try, even if he then fails, rather then tell him that he
should not try because of his low score on a test.6 1
"See, e.g., Larry P. v. Riles, No. C-71-2270 R.F.P., slip op. at 11-19 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 16,
1979), appeal docketed, No. 80-4029 (9th Cir. Jan. 17, 1980).
60 A. JENSEN, supra note 14, at 719. When Jensen discusses "special education," he does
not refer to these lower tracks but rather to classes for persons with clear physical or mental
handicaps. See id. at 720.

61 Id. at 720.
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Jensen, therefore, suggests that test scores should not be utilized
to limit opportunity in primary or secondary schools. Even if test
scores are psychometrically valid in terms of predictive validity,
the validity is too limited to deny individual opportunities to socalled "overachievers" or potential "overachievers." He strikes a
logical balance against the harmful use of testing, a balance that
should be even easier to strike if the problem of adverse impact on
minority groups is considered.
For similar reasons, Jensen believes achievement tests should be
substituted generally for intelligence tests: "There is no routine
use of IQ or aptitude tests in the schools for which well-designed
scholastic achievement tests would not better serve the same purpose." 2 The single score of intelligence tests, with the inevitable
implication of a fixed measure of potential, is simply not worth the
risks of abuse.63 Even if school psychologists give the test in order
to try to understand an individual's academic problems, the score
should not be communicated to teachers, parents, or pupils:
Description of the pupil's educational problem should be given
in terms of scholastic performance per se, and its trend over
the pupil's years in school. It is part of the school psychologist's job to try and find, through examination, any factors in
the school or home situation that might feasibly be altered to
the benefit of the pupil's scholastic progress, personal development, and self-esteem."
Again, the predictive validity of intelligence tests is not such that
it can or should be used to perpetuate the inequalities reflected in
different scores. Primary and secondary school students can have
their accomplishments measured by grades and achievement tests
that cover the material supposed to be learned, but the psychometric properties of IQ tests militate against using such scores to limit
opportunities for educational success or avoid developing "factors
in the school or home situation" that can help beat the predictions.
From a legal point of view, therefore, psychometrics should produce no hesitation for invalidation of intelligence tests that, as a
matter of fact, do limit educational opportunities for members of
minority groups in primary and secondary schools. Even Jensen
strikes the balance against testing, doing it simply on individualistic and psychometric grounds.
But the question now is how far to go with this analysis. Jensen
Id. at 716.
Id.; see id. at 722-23.
, Id. at 723.
"
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does not strike the balance in the same way for testing as a means
to screen admissions to college: "No injustice is done by the use of
standardized academic aptitude tests for college admission." 65 Yet
his argument takes account of the limitations on individual opportunity inherent in decisions based on predictive validity. He states
that no one is hurt by institutions that rely on the limited predictive validity obtainable from test scores. The reason is that an individual can find a college that is best suited to the predicted academic performance, and if the individual does well in that setting
in the first year or two, he or she can transfer to "an academically
more demanding college." 66
This picture of intercollege mobility is probably a bit exaggerated, but for present purposes the interesting point is that Jensen
again is compelled to compensate for denials of opportunity based
on test scores. Arguing on individualistic, psychometric grounds,
Jensen comes to a position consistent with what might be urged
from the point of view of an assumption of equality of potential.
Jensen's analysis, however, does not help us with the problem of
admissions to professional schools such as those required for careers in law and medicine. There we cannot contend that everyone
can find a place in some appropriate institution. A 1977 study
found, for example, that only 43,513 of the 76,061 applicants to law
school were offered one or more places of admission.67 For black
candidates, the figures were 1,697 out of 4,299, and for Chicano
candidates 510 out of 1,085.68 Many students simply do not get an
opportunity to enter these professions.
Nevertheless, Jensen does not worry about denials of opportunities to these schools. Before discussing his position, two other relevant concerns that he introduces can help provide further perspective. The first concern is evinced with respect to testing generally
for employment purposes. Here he emphasizes "the distinction between the prediction of performance during job training and performance after the completion of training,"69 and he would include
the initial job performance within the period of training. This distinction is essential because training and initial job performance
tend to be predicted better by standardized tests than is subse'
'

Id. at 726.
Id.

67 CARNEGIE COUNCIL ON POLICY STUDIES IN HIGHER EDUCATION, SELECTIVE ADMISSIONS IN

HIGHER EDUCATION 188 (1977).
" Id. at 189.
" A. JENSEN, supra note 14, at 728 (emphasis omitted); see id. at 312-13.
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quent job performance. What this means is minorities or others
who may be excluded on the basis of low test scores could become,
after a period of time on the job, just as good employees as those
not excluded. Therefore, in Jensen's words: "The whole issue...
hinges on the duration and cost of the training required for a particular job, as well as on the ultimate success-failure ratio of trainees as a function of their test scores. ' 70 And, for him, the idea of
such training would be "wholly unrealistic . . . for those 'highlevel' jobs in which not only the training for the job but the performance of the job itself constantly makes demands of a highly g71
loaded [i.e., intellectual] nature.
We do not know how much training can overcome a lack of academic skills, or at what cost, for many occupations. What is significant at this point, however, is simply to note the concerns Jensen's
statement reflects. Jensen's sensitivity to the limits of predictive
validity in individual cases has thus far led him to reject tracking
of elementary school students on the basis of predictions of academic performance, to advocate that students generally be permitted to try and fail rather than be denied an opportunity because of
a prediction of failure, and to ask whether special training efforts
and experience at developing certain skills can substitute in many
instances for decisions based on predictions. Predictive validity,
therefore, is of limited practical meaning; it is not necessarily a
license to select a person only, or primarily, on the basis of test
scores that predict future success.
One further aspect of predictive validity must be examined
before a more concrete evaluation of the uses and abuses of testing
from a legal policy standpoint can be attempted. Jensen makes the
argument that the purpose of admissions tests like the LSAT is
not to predict individual performances, but to maximize the academic potential from an institutional point of view. More precisely,
the utility of testing for placement in a position open only to some
applicants depends on the test's "accuracy of predicting success or
failure. 7M Given some predictive validity coupled with a selective
placement process, the use of the tests can substantially decrease
the failure rate of those who are accepted.73 The greater the selectivity, the more useful a test with a given predictive validity.
Several implications follow from this type of defense of testing
70Id. at 728.
71
71
7

Id. at 728-29.
Id. at 306; see id. at 47-48.
See id. at 307-09.
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for placement or selection. The need to avoid limiting opportunities for individuals who are predicted to fail has already been considered. Predictive validity is too low to enable accurate prediction
of the future performance of particular individuals. In addition,
the success or failure rate of the group admitted, which can be predicted with some accuracy, must be seen as a somewhat arbitrary
figure. This figure depends on the number of applicants and number of openings, given a certain predictive validity. The institution
can to some extent adjust those factors. But an individual should
be able to make no claim of right on the basis of that individual's
predicted performance. There is no objective psychometrical reason to insist on maximizing the success rate. Maximizing institutional academic success is one of many possible institutional goals,
and at the very least it must be balanced against the fairness of the
process to individuals. 4 Therefore, as a matter of legal policy, for
example, if the impact of a given admissions system based solely
on predictive validity is adverse to minority individuals, it should
not necessarily be immune from legal attack on the basis that the
success rate was being maximized from an institutional perspective. The institution-Jensen's analysis suggests-must defend its
choice of the particularpredicted success or failure rate.
The soundest claim of psychometrics-predictive validity-provides no compelling basis to follow one selection policy as opposed
to another. Indeed the limitations of predictive validity require,
even for Jensen, that it be balanced in some manner against denials of individual opportunity. If this is so, however, the question is
why Jensen and others still want individuals to be ranked and selected primarily on how well they are predicted to do, given their
grades and their test scores. The reason must be that they want
something more than predictive validity. Their belief is that a
"meritocracy" is the best possible society, and test scores 'help to
build such a society.75 From a societal standpoint, a reliance on the
formula for predicted academic success can maximize the success
rate. But that of course is simply one form of social planning that
sacrifices some qualified individuals in pursuit of a plan. It can
have no more philosophical validity than a form of social planning
that tries to diminish poverty and racial prejudice on the assumption that a meritocracy at this stage of our society is really a veiled
7' See

Lerner, Equal Protection and External Screening: Davis, DeFunis, and Bakke, in

EDUCATIONAL MEASUREMENT & THE LAW 3 (Proceedings of the 1977 ETS Invitational Con-

ference, 1978).
7' See, e.g., A. JENSEN, supra note 14, at 391-98.
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means of perpetuating undeserved inequality.
The above observation returns us to the assumption with which
this review began. If the current distribution of wealth, power, and
opportunity is basically a correct one, and minorities hve failed to
share proportionately in successes essentially because of their own.
inherent deficiencies, then a "meritocracy" that will perpetuate the
status quo might be chosen. But if we assume equality of potential
and look at the position of certain groups in our society, we ought
not to acquiesce in the adverse impact on minorities of "objective"
standards that, by Jensen's own admission, will unfairly deny opportunities to qualified individuals.
THE EFFORT TO IGNORE PREDICTIVE VALIDITY

Even if tests have a relatively limited predictive validity, however, that does not mean we should eliminate them. Yet the recent
Nader Report on the Educational Testing Service suggests that the
tests as presently designed should not be used at all in college and
graduate admissions decisions. 76 There is much useful debunking
in the Nader Report, but its attack on standardized testing ignores the utility of instruments that can maximize our ability to
predict academic performance. The Nader Report argues that particular test items are biased, that there is a majority culture reflected in the standardized tests, that the tests do not predict subsequent job performance as well as they do initial academic
performance, that academic grades are by and large better
predictors of academic success than are the test scores, and that
the test scores are in general "no better than chance" predictors of
an individual's subsequent performance. 7" While the first two criticisms may have some cogency if tests are sought to be used to
measure intellectual capacity or potential, Jensen argues convincingly that they are irrelevant to the question of predictive valid7' See A. NAmN, supra note 12, at 384-89.
77 Interestingly, Jensen makes the following criticism of the large test publishers, such as
Educational Testing Service and the Psychological Corporation:
Today we possess the necessary psychometric technology for producing considerably better tests than are now in popular use. The principal hindrances are
copyright laws, vested interests of test publishers in the established tests in
which they have already made enormous investments, and the market economy
for tests.
A. JENSEN, supra note 14, at 138.
78 See generally A. NAmN, supra note 12, at 55-160.
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ity. 9 The other criticisms have some power, as I have suggested,

although the "no better than chance" formulation is misleading in
terms of what the tests can do.80 Still, even if grades are better
predictors in many instances, that does not mean that we should
not try to combine grades with test scores and other information to
yield a still better predictor.
In the absence of some type of affirmative action program, there
is no question that a formula for predictive validity that includes a
standardized test score will have a serious adverse impact on minorities. On the other hand, the substitution of undergraduate
achievement for that formula could be just as bad, since grades
would probably be discounted or appreciated depending upon the
relative prestige or "rigor" of the undergraduate institutions. This
would be necessary to cope with the likely large number of candidates who will look similar on paper. Other substitutes such as personal or academic references tend also to carry more weight to the
extent they are from conventionally successful persons, and that,
too, may give an edge to the well-to-do. The problem is that underprivileged minorities tend to have worse "credentials" than middle
class white students, and eliminating one credential will not affect
that social fact. And if we try to construct a formula that predicts
successful performance later in life, as the Nader Report suggests
might be desirable, we might end up with the same formula that
enabled the Princeton class of John D. Rockefeller III to select him
as "Most Likely to Succeed."
Furthermore, it is naive to ignore test scores that have some predictive validity. These scores can predict objectively that, all
things being equal, if a given number of persons with these records
are admitted, one should expect a certain rate of failure. This tells
us that something must be done to help those who are predicted to
do badly, since otherwise the prophecy will come true. To ignore
predictive validity will not change academic results. Indeed, the
use of some formula as a guide to admissions of "low predictors"
can help the institution's affirmative action program succeed with
the minorities who are admitted specially. We should not try to
hide the fact that in our present society, certain traditionally disadvantaged groups have not received the academic benefits of a
middle class culture, a middle class income, and middle class
See A. JENSEN, supra note 14, at 635-714.
80 Compare my formulation in the text accompanying note 55 supra. This criticism is of
course made in some detail in the reply of ETS to the Nader Report, A. NAmN, supra note
12. See EDUCATIONAL TESTING SERVICE, TEST USE AND VALIDITY 16-21 (1980).
79
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schools. That is the same as expecting academic miracles from desegregation. Removing a few obstacles to advancement does not by
any means overcome the fundamental problems created by poverty
and racial prejudice. Affirmative action programs can help in a
modest way. But we must admit that, all things being equal, those
who come from disadvantaged backgrounds in our society are not,
on the average, going to defy the predictions. Indeed, to the extent
tests do have predictive validity and predict poor performances for
minorities, that is a serious criticism of the system that has produced that phenomenon. The situation needs to be addressed, not
ignored.
TESTING AND THE LAW:

A

CONCLUSION

This review has sought to initiate and help structure a dialogue
between the science of psychometrics as presented by Jensen and
legal policy. Beginning with what seems to be a reasonable legal
assumption and focusing on Jensen's "scientific" as opposed to
"ideological" opinions, Jensen's detailed, 800-page defense of testing has been turned into a modest and useful document for those
concerned with the role of standardized testing in denying or enhancing educational opportunities. Seen in this manner, Jensen's
careful and limited defense of testing suggests that the law should
have little hesitation in intervening in what may otherwise have
appeared to be an area too complex for serious legal scrutiny.81
The key to a defense of testing is predictive validity, and we must
take predictive validity seriously. Tests with predictive validity can
be important and useful in documenting what is likely to occur,
but they cannot vindicate the applications of test scores to deny
educational opportunities. Complicated issues remain about what
legal policies should be developed pursuant to the ambiguous legal
81 In

the very recent case of Parents in Action on Special Educ. v. Hannon, No. 74-C-3586
(N.D. Il. July 7, 1980), the district court judge rejected an attack on IQ tests used for
assignment to special classes for the "educable mentally handicapped." The decision upholding the tests was based on an analysis of each item of the tests to determine if it was
culturally biased, and the judge found one item on the Stanford-Binet and eight on the
Wechsler tests to be biased. Jensen's own defense of testing, however, suggests that the
judge's focus was on the wrong question. The tests result in a heavily disproportionate enrollment of black students in special classes that inevitably presuppose a limited potential
for learning, and the question must be whether the tests are valid for assignment of minorities to those classes. Cultural bias against minorities does not mean that particular items are
bad but that the use of these tests limits opportunities for minorities without a satisfactory
explanation as to why that reflects an inability to take advantage of greater opportunities.
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mandate for equal educational opportunity. Recent efforts in the
law to scrutinize testing practices carefully should not be deterred
from further efforts by the findings of Jensen's "exhaustive
review."

